Summary
Introduction and background
Africa has the world's highest rates of rural population growth, and fastest decline in the land area available per farm worker (FAO 2000) . Prominent observers have argued that increasing land scarcity could lead to soil degradation, and perhaps irreversible declines in the productivity of labor and other resources applied to land (e.g. WRI 1999 , UNEP 2000 . Alternatively, land scarcity could lead farmers to invest in soil improvement, perhaps eventually triggering sustained growth in productivity and income as suggested by Boserup (1965) .
Earlier work has found some evidence for a Boserup effect at the aggregate level in Africa, using cross-country data (Lusigi and Thirtle 1997) . In this paper we look at the field level, using two years of survey data from Burkina Faso to quantify farmers' adoption of specific soil improvement techniques, and ask how economic or policy conditions affect the intensity of their adoption. Respondents are very low-income farmers, facing a variety of land-scarcity and land tenure regimes (Sourabi 1999) . Their choices could provide important insight into how cropland is managed under conditions of extreme scarcity and widespread degradation.
Whether land scarcity leads to a downward spiral of soil degradation and yield decline, or to a virtuous cycle of soil conservation and productivity growth, might depend in part on
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p. 2 the evolution of property rights over land. Traditional land tenure systems in Burkina Faso and most of Africa involve revocable use-rights managed by community leaders (Bassett and Crummey 1993) . Such systems may have been useful in the past, but could be increasingly costly as population growth raises the need for long-term investments whose returns may be heavily "taxed" by the absence of ownership rights (Goldstein and Udry 1999) . Property rights are likely to be important not only for cropland but also for pastures, to the extent that enclosing animals facilitates the recovery of manure which is usually lost when herders have access to commons grazing (Dalton and Masters 1998) .
What is at stake in soil quality is not only the productivity of natural resources, but also the productivity of labor and other inputs applied to land. Thus an increase in land scarcity that leads to a new property-rights regime and hence accelerated investment in soil quality could be the mechanism for a Boserup effect, translating higher population density into faster total productivity growth and faster growth of real incomes (Rosenzweig, Binswanger and McIntire 1988) .
In our survey regions as elsewhere, farmers have long experience using labor to improve their fields. Two of the oldest and most important such soil and water conservation (SWC) techniques in Burkina Faso are bunds (low stone or dirt walls to stop surface runoff) and microcatchments (small holes into which compost or manure is placed and plants are seeded, to concentrate available moisture and nutrients). Both techniques help hold soil and water for delivery to plants, producing a well-documented increase in the productivity of land and inputs (Ouedraogo and Illy 1996; Ouedraogo and Bertelsen Investing in Soils: Bunds and Microcatchments in Burkina Faso p. 3 1997). By holding soil and water in place they represent fundamental long-term investments that complement variable inputs, including organic as well as inorganic fertilizers. Such investments could become more attractive as land becomes increasingly scarce relative to labor. They may also become more attractive as farmers gain more secure ownership rights over land. A third kind of incentive could come from reduced access to commons grazing, as more intensive livestock management makes manure more available for use on cropland. This paper tests these propositions, which provide possible mechanisms for Boserup-type effects by which increased population, interacting with property rights, could lead to productivity growth over time.
Determinants of SWC investment
The average level of soil and water conservation investment in Burkina Faso can be described as moderate. Measuring investment level in terms of the share of land on which SWC techniques have been applied, in our survey areas we found bunds on 19 percent of cropped land, microcatchments on 27 percent of cropped land, and both techniques together on 7 percent (Table 2) .
Previous studies of the determinants of SWC investment have focused on farmers' subjective beliefs and sources of information (e.g. Shively 1997 , Anim 1999 , BaiduForson 1999 , as well as farmers' material conditions such as farm assets, factor markets, and population pressure (e.g. Laper and Pandey 1999 , Pender and Kerr 1998 , Barbier 1998 and the review by Templeton and Scherr 1997). Here we aim to isolate the influence of the relative abundance of land and labor (entering separately in the model), Investing in Soils: Bunds and Microcatchments in Burkina Faso p. 4 from the property-rights regime that governs cropland ("ownership" as opposed to userights) and grazing (intensive livestock management as opposed to open-access grazing).
These factors are investigated in the context of several control variables, such as socioeconomic conditions and physical geography, as listed in Table 1 and detailed below.
Availability of cropland and farm labor
Our core measures of land and labor abundance are cropped acreage per farm, and the number of men and women aged 15 and over. We count males and females separately because gender influences the kinds of tasks most often undertaken, and families differ in composition. We enter separate variables for land and labor, rather than the land/labor ratio, to capture scale effects that might arise from having more of both in a single household.
In Burkina Faso, average farm size varies across villages by far more than could be explained by underlying differences in land quality, due to disease pressure and political boundaries influencing migration. Since the mid-1970s, there have been large population movements southward to escape drought, and into valleys to take advantage of onchocerciasis control (Sourabie 1999). The result is large variance in cropland scarcity across surveyed regions, with farm size varying by a factor of 100, from 0.2 to over 20 hectares per household (Table 2) . Across villages, controlling for family size and composition, we see village-average land-labor ratios ranging from 0.2 to 0.87 hectares per worker (Annex Table 1 ). (These data convert the population into adult-equivalent Investing in Soils: Bunds and Microcatchments in Burkina Faso p. 5 workers to facilitate comparison across households, using conversion factors from Tabatai 1993.)
The effect cropland scarcity on SWC investment is ambiguous. On the one hand, higher land scarcity could bring a substitution effect towards land-saving, labor-using techniques (e.g. Anim 1999 found that South African farmers with less land make greater investments in soil conservation, and Adesina and Zinnah 1993 found that smaller farmers invest more in new rice varieties). On the other hand, indivisibilities and scale effects could make some new technologies more profitable on larger farms (e.g. Nichola and Sanders 1996 found that larger farms were more likely to adopt a hybrid sorghum in Sudan). For bunds and microcatchments, farmers with less land but more labor may have a greater incentive to use labor to raise yields, but farmers with more land may make greater investments of all kinds, so the net effect of land scarcity remains ambiguous. In any event, since the degree of land scarcity is largely exogenous to policy decisions, we are concerned less with its direct effects than with policy responses to it, including particularly the evolution of property rights.
Property rights
We use two distinct indicators to capture the property-rights regime governing cropland and grazing areas. For cropland, we measure the security of tenure by the proportion of area that the farmer reported to be "borrowed" or "rented" as opposed to "owned". For pasture, we measure ease of access to commons grazing by the labor-intensity with which livestock are managed. Each measure is discussed in turn below. Bunds and Microcatchments in Burkina Faso p. 6 Cropland markets in Burkina offer no formal land tenure categories. Colonial authorities and post-independence governments have sustained traditional use-rights, through which village leaders allocate land across extended families, whose leaders in turn allocate it among individual households. Since 1984 a series of land-tenure decrees have been enacted, but in practice tenure continues to be governed by traditional arrangements (Sourabie 1999). In our data, farmers reported as "owned" the land that was securely within the control of their own extended family. "Borrowed" or "rented" land had been obtained on a temporary basis from another family. Across our survey villages, the proportion of cropland not owned by the operator's family ranged from zero in one village, to 54 percent in another (Appendix Table 1 ). We expect that land not owned is less likely to be improved with bunds and microcatchments, due to the long-term nature of these investments.
Investing in Soils:
Livestock grazing in Burkina are still predominantly done on common lands. The dominance of commons grazing over other feeding arrangements is often an appropriate response to the low density and "patchy" distribution of pasture resources (Scoones et al. 1996) . Nonetheless, a rising density of people and livestock is leading farmers to take livestock into more intensive feeding systems, in response to less abundant pasture and less access to what pasture there is (Fisher et al. 2000) . One effect of more intensive feeding is that manure becomes more easily available, raising the productivity of soils and the potential value of SWC investments to prevent erosion and retain moisture (Sanchez et al. 1997 , Palm et al. 1997 . Bunds and Microcatchments in Burkina Faso p. 7 In our data we measure the combined effect of pasture scarcity and pasture rights in terms of the intensity with which farmers manage their livestock, as the number of adults involved in feeding and monitoring animals on the farm. Typical practice in commons grazing is for children to walk with the herds to monitor strays, deter theft, and return the animals at night. As pasture becomes scarce and conflict over grazing areas worsens, herd owners adopt more intensive feeding systems that require increasing numbers of adult workers. Thus child and adult labor represent distinct animal-feeding technologies, and are not close substitutes: in an auxiliary regression, the number of children monitoring animals is found to have no effect on the number of adults involved. The number of adults is zero for many households, and the village-wide averages vary from 0.03 to 4.67 (Appendix Table 1 ).
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The link between open-access grazing, manure use, and crop productivity was detailed by Dalton and Masters (1998) , using a biophysical model of crop production linked to an economic model of crop and livestock choices, calibrated to farming conditions in Southern Mali. In their model, it is optimal for farmers who have access to public grazing to use that resource, but when pasture taxes or forage scarcity induce farmers to intensify livestock management, doing so increases manure use and raises crop productivity. We hypothesize that, in the Burkina Faso context, more intensive livestock p. 8 management could also lead to more investment in bunds and microcatchments, since manure availability helps increase the value of soil and the cost of erosion. We expect that livestock management decisions are driven by pasture scarcity independently of SWC investment, but there is also some possibility of reverse causality as intensification of livestock care may be an endogenous response to SWC investment. We investigate that possibility with exogeneity tests.
Control variables
To test for independent effects of our land, labor and property-rights variables, we must control for a wide range of other factors that may influence SWC investments.
Our first set of controls are regional dummy variables, to account for omitted variables reflecting soil quality or other agroeconomic factors. There may be some residual variance in these factors across villages and households, but to use village dummies would exhaust our degrees of freedom.
A second kind of control is the share of the household's land that is exploited by women as opposed to men. This could matter for SWC investment if gender influences preferences, or affects access to particular resources. In the Burkina context, women are likely to face more severe constraints in credit markets which would inhibit all kinds of investment, are may also have less secure land-use rights whether or not the land is owned by their family. They may also have relatively less of the upper-body strength Investing in Soils: Bunds and Microcatchments in Burkina Faso p. 9 needed to construct bunds and microcatchments, although in the Burkina context women do undertake these and many other onerous tasks.
A third kind of control concerns household wealth and income. Wealthier households may be have greater access to capital, facilitating investment, but they may also have higher opportunity costs of labor, inhibiting labor-intensive activities such as SWC. One way we measure wealth is through households' reported real expenditure on non-food consumption goods, per adult equivalent, converted into foodgrain units at local relative prices for ease of comparison. The underlying assumption is Engel's law, by which nonfood expenditure rises rapidly with wealth, making it a particularly sensitive measure for our purposes. Another observed measure of wealth is the value of agricultural equipment on the farm, representing the accumulation of capital assets over time. And a third measure concerns the household's access to off-farm income, which may provide farm finance but also draw labor off the farm.
Analytical approach
To distinguish the marginal effects of each variable, we assume that farmers respond to their circumstances in a consistent utility-maximizing way, as in Rahm and Huffman (1984) and Adesina and Zinnah (1993) . A particular technology is adopted when the anticipated utility from using it exceeds that of non-adoption. Though it is not observed directly, the utility (U) for a particular farmer (i) to use a particular technique (j) can be defined as a farm-specific function of some vector of technology characteristics, plus a disturbance term with zero mean:
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where 1 represents adoption of the new technology and 0 represents continued use of the old technology. The i th farmer adopts j=1 if U i1 > U i0 .
For empirical purposes, the utility of adoption U ij can be inferred from farmers' binary choice (adopt or not adopt) or some continuous choice over a predefined interval (intensity of adoption). The former implies a probit or a logit model, as in Lapar and Pander (1999) and Anim (1999) . To consider the intensity of adoption, a Tobit model is needed, as in Lynne et al (1988) , Adesina and Zinnah (1993) and Baidu-Forson (1999) .
Assuming that G is linear, from McDonald and Moffit (1980) we have the underlying stochastic model in Tobit form:
Where X is as defined above, Y is the dependent variable vector, β is a vector of unknown parameters and µ is a normally distributed disturbance term with mean 0 and constant variance σ 2 . The expected value of Y can be written as:
Where F is the cumulative normal distribution, z is defined as , Y* is the observations above the threshold, and E stands for the expectation operator (see Greene 1997 for full discussion.). Using (3), McDonald and Moffit first showed that the marginal effect of an independent variable has two components and can be decomposed as follows:
The first term on the RHS is the expected response of current users to the change in x i and the second term is the response of non-users. By multiplying both sides by x i /E(y i ), one can interpret the results as the usual elasticities. These elasticities have been termed as the elasticity of expected use intensity and the elasticity of adoption probability respectively.
Data sources and survey methods
The data were collected in eight villages in four different regions of Burkina Faso during the 1993 and 1994 cropping years. The covered regions are the Namentenga province in the Central Plateau, the Soum province in the North, the Kossi province in the West and the Nahouri province in the Southeast.
In each region, two representative villages were chosen, one representing the wealthier villages and the other reflecting the poorer ones in that region, and then 35 households were randomly selected in each village except in the North where 40 households were chosen in anticipation of a higher dropout rate due to out-migration. Agriculture is the main activity in all regions, but livestock is more important in the North, which has also experienced the greatest population pressure and soil degradation.
The survey covered farm characteristics, production technologies, inputs and outcomes, consumption levels and marketing activities. To facilitate repeat visits, an enumerator
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p. 12 was installed in each village with a coordinator for each survey region. The farmer responsible each individual plot was interviewed, and the head of the household was interviewed regarding the common plots. For some variables, such as field area, each plot operator was visited once, while multiple visits were required for management variables such labor allocation, animals feeding and monitoring. Table 2 presents statistics for the variables used in our model, and selected others.
Estimation methods and model specification
To recover correlations between SWC investments and their determinants (the β parameters of equation 2), we begin with standard MLE methods (Maddala 1983 , Greene 1997 , and then use semi-parametric methods (following Powell 1984 and Deaton 1997) to remedy some non-standard characteristics of our data. We also report results for the Cragg (1971) generalization of the Tobit, as a more flexible specification. 2 The MLE results and implied elasticities are presented in Tables 3 and 6 , while the semi-parametric results are in Tables 4 and 7 , and the Cragg model results are in Tables 5 and 8 . In all cases, separate regressions are reported for bunds, for microcatchments, and for the two techniques together.
One of the key variables whose influence we wish to estimate, livestock intensification, could itself have been influenced by farmers' SWC choices. To test whether endogeneity p. 13 matters in this context we use the approach developed by Smith and Blundell (1986) , as applied by Shively (1998) , in which exogeneity holds if α=0 in the regression:
where y 1 is the adoption variable, y 2 is the potentially endogenous variable, and 2 v is the residuals from an OLS regression of y 2 on a set of instrumental variables. 3 We can reject endogeneity at the 1 percent level for the three regressions, and hence no remedy is needed.
Maximum likelihood Tobit estimates can be highly sensitive to non-normality and heteroskedasticity of the disturbance terms (Deaton 1997) , and indeed our diagnostic tests reject normality and homoskedasticity for these regressions. We present MLE results because the technique remains widely used, but also apply semi-parametric Censored Least Absolute Deviations (CLAD) estimators that are less sensitive to non-normality and are robust to heteroskedasticity (Powell 1984) . Comparison between the CLAD and the MLE estimates provide an indication of the effects of non-normality and heteroskedasticity on the regression coefficients (Deaton 1987) . In this case, estimates are of somewhat lower magnitude and different significance levels using CLAD than using MLEs, but the principal results are the same.
p. 14 In addition to normality and homoskedasticity of the errors, we are also concerned with specification of the model. A first kind of specification test is whether Tobit itself is appropriate. Despite its wide use to study adoption of SWC (Pender and Kerr 1999) and other techniques (Adesina and Zinnah 1993; Baidu-Forson 1999) , it imposes restrictions that could bias our estimates. In particular, the Tobit assumes that the explanatory variables have the same direction of effect on the probability of adoption and on its intensity (Greene 1997) . We find some evidence that this assumption does not hold, using the tests due to Lee and Maddala (1985) and Lin and Schmidt (1984) , and so compare our Tobit results with estimates from the more general specification suggested by Cragg (1971) .
A further kind of specification test asks whether the same model parameters hold across all regions. The basic model includes dummy variables to capture regional differences in the average level of investment, but we would also like to know if there are regional differences in the response of investment to land scarcity or property rights. Our data set is not large enough to estimate separate regressions for each region, but we can construct a test for regional differences in the coefficients on key variables of interest, by adding the interaction of that variable with a dummy for each region (excluding the omitted one).
To avoid adding a large number of regressors, we conduct separate tests for each variable, so the model becomes:
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Where Y and X are as defined previously, the R i are dummy variables for the Namentenga, Kossi and Nahouri regions (with Soum the omitted region), and k is cropland scarcity, cropland ownership, or livestock intensification. Our test asks whether the three R i X k variables in (6) can be omitted from the equation; using conditional moments following Chesher and Irish (1987) . In this case we are unable to reject that hypothesis, and therefore maintain the simpler aggregate model without regional interaction effects.
All diagnostic and specification test results are presented at the bottom of degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions under the null hypothesis. The relevant degrees of freedom are shown with each test, and significance levels are indicated using asterisks.
Regression results
Considering the results of our diagnostic and specification tests, we use three kinds of coefficient estimates: the Tobit model with maximum-likelihood estimates (Table 3) and semi-parametric CLAD estimates (Table 4) , and then the Cragg model with MLEs (Table   5 ). A total of twelve coefficients are estimated for each variable, testing its correlation with adoption of both techniques together, of bunds only, and of microcatchments only, plus separate estimates for adoption and intensity in the Cragg model.
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Looking across the twelve specifications, cropland area and male labor availability per household have generally insignificant effects on both kinds of SWC investment, while female labor availability generally reduces it, when controlling for other factors. This result is consistent with the discussion in section 2.1 above, which noted that the anticipated effect of land and labor availability on SWC investment is ambiguous.
The effects of cropland ownership and livestock intensification are expected to be positive, however, and the regression results generally support that hypothesis. When controlling for factor abundance and other influences, the coefficient on cropland ownership is consistent in sign (negative in all cases except one, so that a greater share of land not owned is associated with less SWC investment) and significant at the 1 percent level in five of the twelve cases and at the 10 percent level in another five cases. The coefficient on livestock intensification is also consistent in sign (positive in all cases except one, so that having more adults caring for livestock is associated with more SWC investment), although the magnitude is small and only significant in 4 of the 12 cases.
Across the specifications, we see a clear pattern of support for the hypothesis that households are more likely to have made more SWC investment if they own the land they farm, and some further support for the hypothesis of more SWC investment if they have devoted more effort to taking animals off of commons grazing. The effects of land scarcity and labor supply, which were thought to be ambiguous, turn out to be varied in sign and generally not significant.
Among the control variables, none of the region dummy variables have coefficients that are consistent in sign, but the coefficient on gender is consistently negative (a larger proportion of land under female control is associated with lower SWC investment), and the three measures related to wealth or income (namely nonfood expenditure, agricultural equipment and off-farm income) are consistently negative, although only the agricultural equipment measure is consistently significant.
The significance of property-rights variables, but not of land scarcity itself, supports the idea that institutional responses to population density rather than population density itself are what drive technical change. In other words, increased density can lead to soil improvement, but only to the extent that it spurs changes in property rights that give the farmer an incentive to do so, by clarifying ownership of cropland and by forcing animals off commons grazing. Differences in property rights could matter not only across households, but within them as well, to the extent that women's less secure land rights helps explain the negative correlations we find between female labor or management and SWC investment.
To illustrate the magnitude of the effects we estimate, Tables 6, 7 and 8 present the implied elasticities and bootstrapped standard errors for each regression. Elasticities with respect to the share of cropland not owned and the number of adults feeding livestock are both under 50 percent using MLE methods, but over 90 percent in three of the six CLAD estimates. These magnitudes are clearly nontrivial, but to obtain more reliable estimates we would need larger sample sizes.
Conclusion
This research uses farm-survey data to investigate the determinants of investment in soil and water conservation technologies at the field level. We consider two different techniques, bunds and microcatchments, plus simultaneous adoption of both. A maximum-likelihood Tobit model was used to link farmers' investment in these techniques to a wide variety of observable variables, using data collected in four different regions of Burkina Faso. Various diagnostic and robustness tests led to estimation of the Tobit using the semi-parametric method suggested by Powell (1984) , and to relaxing Tobit assumptions using the more general model of Cragg (1971) . Across these various specifications, the empirical results of interest vary in magnitude but are consistent in sign and significance.
Our central result is that, when controlling for land and labor availability plus a range of other factors, farmers' SWC investments respond particularly to two policy-influenced variables: the degree to which their land is securely owned (as opposed to being borrowed or rented), and the degree to which their livestock are intensively managed (as opposed to being fed from open-access grazing). These results imply that, as land becomes increasingly scarce, policies to take reflect land scarcity in more clearly defined property rights over cropped areas and commons grazing are likely to encourage investment in soils. These findings provide some grounds for optimism that even the most resource-poor farmers can and do invest in conservation activities, when institutional responses to resource scarcity include clearer definition of property rights. 
Land scarcity & property rights
Cropland scarcity Cropland used per worker (adult equivalents) (ha)
Cropland ownership Cropland used but not "owned" (%)
Livestock intensification Adults involved in monitoring animals (no.) Cropland not owned (%) 15.15 31.77 0.00 100.00 17.30 34.57 0.00 100.00 42.24 47.39 0.00 100.00 0.93 0.25 0.00 100.00 21.26 37.74 0.00 100.00 Labor supply, female (no) 2.30 1.96 0.00 13.00 2.38 1.43 0.00 8.00 1.91 1.29 0.00 7.00 2.35 1.89 0.00 10.00 2.23 1.66 0.00 13.00
Control variables
Labor supply, male (no) 1.90 1.49 0.00 7.00 2.13 1.38 0.00 8.00 1.91 1.20 0.00 5.00 1.97 1.13 0.00 5.00 1.98 1.30 0.00 8.00 Lvtsk. Intens. (# adults) 1.41 1.92 0.00 9.00 0.46 1.02 0.00 5.00 0.98 1.57 0.00 6.00 3.52 2.41 0.00 13.00 1.55 2.11 0.00 13.00
Gender (% by women) 29.09 30.16 0.00 100.00 14.05 24.47 0.00 100.00 0.88 23.89 0.00 100.00 12.47 30.23 0.00 100.00 15.89 28.10 0.00 100.00 Off-farm inc.('000 fcfa/yr) 26623 68150 0.00 522000 64489 104819 0.00 624000 30624 44035 0.00 222000 21156 19433 0.00 92250 36995 70011 0.00 624000 Wealth* (Nonfood cons.) 67.49 99.78 2.86 759.95 144.98 132.05 14.02 740.04 151.41 187.55 11.28 1374.54 101.73 117.63 9.22 751.57 117.91 142.37 2.86 1374.54 Ag. Equip. (1000 cfa) 11952 34632 0.00 142000 11422 34899 0.00 210000 30000 58472 0.00 278000 15454 32896 0.00 150000 17270 42215 0.00 278000 Note: * Our wealth measure is real nonfood expenditure per adult-equivalent, expressed in terms of cereal crops to facilitate comparison across households. (2) 75.5 *** 277.9 *** 203.3 *** Homoskedasticity (1) 9.86 *** 6.70 *** 7.038 *** Tobit--Lee&Maddala (13) 171.9 *** 105.7 *** 37.60 *** Tobit--Lin&Schmidt (14) 379.5 *** 182.9 *** 27.12 **
Regional differences tests
Land (3) (*), 5% (**) and 1% (***) confidence levels. The null hypotheses are that coefficients are zero, the error term is normal and homoskedastic, the Tobit assumption of same explanatory for adoption and use-intensity holds, and the regional effects are zero, as described in the text. All diagnostic and specification tests are distributed as and the corresponding degree of freedom are in parenthesis. 
